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Abstract
Mexico has recently mandated a national defined contribution pension
program known as the AFORES system, modeled on but somewhat
different from the privatization models implemented elsewhere in Latin
America. This study examines evidence on administrative costs of the
AFORES experienced during the program’s start-up phase. We explore
interactions between program design and program expenses and
evaluate likely developments that could alter administrative costs in the
future.
We find that administrative expenses of the Mexican AFORES will
probably change in next few years: they could fall if the program grows
quickly to produce scale economies and start-up costs are amortized
rapidly, but they may rise if services and reporting requirements are
expanded. Policy recommendations emphasize cost reduction but not at
the expense of pension plan performance.

Evaluating Administrative Costs
in Mexico’s AFORES Pension System
In 1997 Mexico adopted a mandatory, funded, defined contribution pension
plan program known as the AFORES system (“Administradoras de Fondos para el
Retiro”). Under this new structure, one that privatizes many tasks previously taken
on by the old national pay-as-you-go social security system, formal-sector
employees contribute to funded pension accounts invested by private (licensed)
money managers. 1 One powerful appeal of the new AFORES system is that it
promises to eventually generate more generous retirement benefits than offered by
the old insolvent national social security program. In this regard, the new Mexican
program resulted from the same factors driving social security “privatization”
reforms elsewhere in Latin America.2 But though many elements of the Mexican
AFORES system are comparable to those of other Latin nations, Mexico’s plan
handles some structural design issues differently from its predecessors. In this
paper we investigate what these design features are, and whether the AFORES
administrative costs might be reduced with further design changes without
undercutting the pension system services of most importance to the program.

1

In this paper we focus on the old-age benefits provided by the AFORES pension
system; for a discussion other social insurance benefits (see Bertin and Perrotto
1997).
2

For recent reviews of developments in Chile see Arrau et al. (1993); Bustamante
(1996); Edwards (1998); Valdes (1994); and Vittas (1995). On Argentina see Bour
and Urbiztondo (1994) and Rofman and Bertin (1996). On Peru and Colombia see
Ayala (1995); von Gersdorff (1997); and Quessar (1997). On Uruguay see Mitchell
(1996). Recent reviews of world-wide pension reform include Bertin and Perrotto
(1997); Demirguc-Kunt and Schwarz (1996); Interamerican Development Bank
(1996); Mitchell and Barreto (1997); Mitchell (1996), and World Bank (1994).
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As one might expect, the players in the AFORES reform – workers,
employers, banks, insurers, and government agencies – underwent substantial
learning during the first year of the reform. It stands to reason, therefore, that some
costs would be expected to decline as the mechanics of the system are routinized,
as pension fund managers learn-by-doing, and as the regulatory and oversight
structures mature. There is also reason to worry that pension costs could rise in the
future if, for instance, money managers begin to increase services to participants or
if regulations increase the costs of doing business.
Rationale for Attention to Pension Administrative Expenses
In the case of a mandatory individual accounts pension system such as the
Mexican AFORES program, pension costs demand attention for several reasons:3
hA system that costs more to administer generates smaller net investments
during the worklife and hence produces lower retiree benefits (other things
equal). Plan designers wanting to enhance retirement income security will
therefore seek to reduce pension administrative costs.
hHigh administrative costs raise equity concerns regarding low-wage
workers. A government that mandates a pension system will seek to avoid
the perception that low-wage workers’ contributions are more heavily “taxed”
by administrative costs that in turn cut their eventual retirement benefits.
hHigher pension administrative costs can raise retiree claims on future
government revenues. This is because some countries guarantee minimum
retirement benefits to workers with inadequate pension accounts; more
people will be eligible for guaranteed benefits, the higher are costs
associated with the individual accounts.
hHigher pension expenses increase incentives for low-wage workers to
evade the pension system. That is, once a minimum wage worker has
contributed enough years to be assured the minimum guaranteed benefit at
retirement age, additional contributions will be perceived as a pure tax.
3

Comparative studies on cross-national public and private pension costs include
Mitchell (1996); Mitchell, Sunden, and Hsin (1994);Queissar (1997), and Valdes
(1993, 1994). See also Mitchell (1996), James and Palacios (1995).

2

hEconomic efficiency concerns imply that pension system charges should
reflect the value of resources used to mount and sustain the pension system.
Otherwise system participants may over- or under-consume retirement
saving as compared to other economic activities.
Having concluded that one must understand what and how a pension plan
incurs expenses, and the services it delivers, it is next important to ask how
effective a pension system is in meeting is goals, and whether its costs adequately
reflect the economic resources used to provide the services rendered (Mitchell and
Sunden 1994). Accordingly we begin by identifying the four key functions central to
any pension plan, namely financing, recordkeeping, money management, and
benefit payouts. While these functions are common to all pensions, the way in
which each function is carried out varies from one plan and country to the next (and
sometimes even across time periods). Depending on the plan design, for instance,
some tasks may be handled privately and others by the public sector. What
matters, of course, is which expenses are associated with administering a pension
plan and what services are received in return.
The way a pension system is financed can have important cost and
performance implications. For example in Mexico, the individual-account pension
system relies on payroll taxes gathered from employee payroll via the national tax
authority. 4 The fact that the taxes are gathered using a centralized mechanism
suggests that pension contribution collection costs would be lower than in Chile,
where individual workers must be contacted frequently by thousands of private
4

The Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) collaborates with the AFORES
system, so that both social insurance and pension contributions are gathered using
a common centralized tax collection authority.

3

pension marketing and collection agents. That is, a central mechanism for
collection of contributions is expected to be less costly than fully “outsourced”
private agent collection system. Of course the potential for scale economies
depends on the credibility and effectiveness of the tax authority; if it is unable to
collect all taxes due, a private sector counterpart might have more incentive and
perhaps better tracking powers with which to gather requisite contributions. 5
A second set of design issues has to do with record-keeping for pension
purposes. In some countries workers must maintain their own work and
contribution records over their worklives, an inefficient practice that results in
retirees failing to be certified as eligible to receive benefits if they lose their
recordbooks. Here the cost of recordkeeping falls on participants; while it might
“appear” inexpensive, in fact the effect of decentralization is to hurt performance.
By contrast, a centralized recordkeeping system might do a better job of keeping
records as in Mexico, where a central data management group is operated by the
private sector (described in more detail below). Important scale economies are
likely in this venue.
An additional key function of an individual account pension system is the
money management task. This is an area where some assert that governments
can invest less expensively than can private investment experts, while others
conclude that private sector managers have superior service and reap higher
rewards – a practice that may offset higher expenses.

5

For a discussion of pension tax evasion see Manchester (forthcomi ng).

4

Similarly with regard to benefit payouts, some argue that a government
provider can offer lower cost service than a private provider, while others contend
that a private provider will be more service oriented and possibly less costly due to
competitive pressures.
As is readily seen, one reason it is difficult to compare administrative
expenses across publicly versus privately managed systems is that different
services are generally provided. Also, when a government takes on one or more of
the four pension functions, the full cost of the function may not always be fully
accounted for. This is particularly a problem when a government does not fully
capture the economic resource values of the tasks undertaken by its employees. 6
In the Mexican context, for instance, the process of collecting pension contributions
is overseen by the central tax authority for a fixed per-worker fee (see Appendix).
This per-worker fee may or may not accurately reflect current collection costs, and
because it is centrally set it cannot change in response to competition.7
Understanding Commissions and Fees in the AFORES System
6

As Reid and Mitchell (1995) point out, “privately-managed pension plans face
strong incentives to keep track of costs, especially if they are free-standing rather
than being an arm of another business…By contrast, publicly-run systems are less
likely to value their costs at market rates to the extent that they do not buy their
inputs directly…For all these reasons, publicly-managed old-age programs could
tend to appear less expensive than they actually are, relative to privately managed
plans.”
7

By comparison, the Argentinian AFJP pension plans are not responsible for any
tax collection costs incurred by the government tax authority, so the pension system
is heavily subsidized by the federal government (Rofman 1997). In Chile, pension
contribution costs are fully tracked and accounted for since private pension fund
agents gather the funds from each contributor. In the US, corporate pension
contributions are typically gathered via the employer, a practice that affords
participants of important scale economies not available in the Chilean case. Indeed

5

Mexico’s new pension system consists of a first-pillar minimum benefit
guaranteed by the state, and a second -pillar program with an individually-owned
mandatory defined contribution (DC) account. 8 This DC account is financed by with
a 6.5% employee payroll tax plus an additional “social quota” provided by the
government from general revenues worth about 2.2% of a low-earner’s wage.9
Payroll taxes are collected from employers under the supervision of the government
national social security system (IMSS); these monies are deposited in designated
“receiving banks” (Entidades Receptores) that then transfer the funds to the Central
Bank of Mexico. Subsequently these funds are deposited within a specified time
period at the privately-operated pension fund manager selected by each worker.

legislation pending in Chile would permit employers to collect contributions and
negotiate commissions with the AFPs (Valdes 1997a).
8

For a detailed discussion of the recent Mexican reforms see Cerda and Grandolini
(1997); Sales and Solis (1998); IMSS (1997), and World Bank (1996). It is worth
noting that the government social security agency (IMSS) retains several important
roles under the Mexican reform, including the guarantee of a minimum benefit
equivalent to the minimum wage in the capital city, and also the provision of
disability and health insurance. Having the government play a key role in
maintaining a first-pillar old -age benefit is a common pattern in the Latin American
countries that have implemented individual account pensions (Mitchell and Barreto
1997). Costs associated with the administrative costs of the first pillar system are
not the focus of the present paper but I Chile were similar to those of the privatized
plan (Reid and Mitchell 1995).
9

Effective year-end 1997, the law has allowed workers to rollover both SAR and
INFONAVIT funds saved prior to 1998 into their AFORES accounts. The former
refers to a previous and now-terminated effort to get workers to pay into
government-managed funds; the latter refers to a mandatory 5% of pay contribution
to INFONAVIT, a national scheme to foster saving for home purchase. At
retirement these SAR and INFONAVIT funds will be available as a lump sum or as
an increment to pension benefits. It is expected that future SAR and INFONAVIT
contributions will become fully integrated into the AFORES accounts are treated like
regular accumulations (CONSAR 1998).

6

The pension plans, of which 17 were licensed at the system’s inception, are
called AFORES (“Administradoras de Fondos para el Retiro”).10 These AFORES
may invest pension monies in high-quality Mexican public and private financial
assets; while the funds currently hold mostly indexed government bonds, the plan is
to liberalize these limits over time. Nevertheless foreign investments are prohibited,
along with a range of other limitations on portfolio composition. 11 During the first
year of operations, participants were required to remain with the initially-elected
AFORE so as to discourage turnover and to preserve scale economies. 12 System
reporting is handled by a privately-managed data collection firm (PROCESAR) that
receives daily information on fund flows and affiliates, and supervisory responsibility
is the charge of a new government pension agency (CONSAR) that oversees the
entire private pension structure.
To retire under the new system after a full work career, a worker must be at
least 65 years old and must have contributed at least 24 years to the plan. 13 At that
point, the retiree’s benefit depends on his AFORE accumulation which in turn varies
10

One pension plan, AFORE Preventir, is being liquidated as of 11/98; see
www.notisar.com/noticias.
11

No AFORE may hold over 15% of any one issuer’s paper; the limit is 5% if the
firm is linked financially to the AFORE. Other limits also exist, including on the
maximum amount of the portfolio that can be held in domestic equities ; maximums
for a ny single company; prohibitions on a pension fund owning a controlling interest
in a company; only highly rated private paper and bank deposits are permitted; and
Mexican company shares issued on international capital markets will be permitted
only if they meet rating criteria (CONSAR 1998, and Mitchell and Barreto 1997).
12

New rules permitting worker transfer across pension funds were recently
promulgated.
13

Workers having accumulated years of service under the old system will be able to
elect a benefit payable under the old system, or their new-system benefit, whichever

7

with plan contributions and investment returns on these contributions over time.
The retiree is allowed to use his AFORE accumulation to purchase an annuity from
a private insurance company, or alternatively he may receive a programmed
withdrawal as long as his monthly payment is at least as large as a minimum
pension guaranteed by the government. The guaranteed minimum pension is equal
to the minimum wage in Mexico City or about 40% of the average wage (1 minimum
salary is currently P$24 daily, or about US$3.10).14 Early retirement is permitted if
the worker’s AFORES benefit can purchase a benefit at least 130% of the minimum
pension.
Benefits may become higher to the extent that two other accounts are
expected to be melded with the AFORES accounts in the future. First, participants
in the old Mexican SAR system accumulated funds that are gradually being
amalgamated into the new individual pensions. Second, the AFORES are
expected to take over management of a separate 5% payroll tax currently devoted
to a national housing account (known as INFONAVIT). Completing these efforts will
contribute importantly to the amount of the program’s eventual private pension
benefit.
Mexico’s First Year of Pension System Operations
The Mexican AFORES system began to operate in the spring of 1997, with
17 pension plans entering the market and enrolling participants in anticipation of the
first contribution date in October of 1997. At the system’s inception it was expected
is greater. See Cerda and Grandolini (1997) and Sales and Solis (1996) for more
detail on the Mexican reform.

8

that there would be approximately 11 million eligible workers – those who had been
contributing under the old social security system – and of these, approximately 10.7
million chose an AFORE into which their pension taxes began to be paid during the
program’s first year. 15 By the spring of 1998, it was determined that an additional
number of people who were not actively in the private sector had also started up
AFORES accounts, often to consolidate their preexisting SAR accounts, or to start
accounts financed by voluntary contributions. As a result of this group’s entrance to
the system, the government raised its target of potentially eligible persons to 14.8
million, and the system’s total number of affiliates now stands at about 13 million
workers. 16
In terms of financial flows, the initial deposit of contributions as of end November 1997 totaled USD$331M, of which $260M resulted from workers’ payroll
taxes and $72M from the government “social quota” (CONSAR 1997a). This
amounted to an average bi-monthly contribution per active worker of USD$49,
translating to an eventual annual flow into the pension system of $294 per worker
(in ’97 dollars). 17 During 1998 (through September), monthly AFORES mandatory
contributions averaged about US$542M per month, with fund totals standing at

14

Throughout this paper we use the exchange rate prevailing around December 1,
1997, which was P$8=US$1.
15

See CONSAR 1997a; this includes participants that did not elect a pension and
were allocated to a government account that guarantees a 2% real return per
annum.
16

Reported by AFORE Profuturo at www.gnp.com.mx, as of August 1998.

17

Voluntary additional contributions are also permitted, though these are not
expected to amount to much until their tax status is clarified

9

about US$5.4B.18 Experts anticipate that the Mexican pension system will manage
at least US$10B by the year 2000 (Werner 1997).
Affiliation of participants across AFOREs was uneven in the system’s first
year of operation (see Table 1). In late 1997, total affiliation stood at about 10.7
million participants, with five funds attracting over one million affiliates each; at the
same time the smallest plans had only 16-19 thousand participants. The system is
now larger after one year of operation: seven funds have attracted over one million
participants and two are around the two million mark (see Table 2). Nevertheless
there remain several small plans with fewer than 100,000 participants, plans that
may be too small to remain freestanding over time. Substantial variability is also
evident in terms of the types of participants attracted to the different AFOREs. For
instance at inception the system boasted about 80% active participants, with the
rest being nonworking individuals, but the range ran from 62% to 94%.19 Table 1
also reveals plan-specific patterns in pay levels; for instance one fund had 20% of
its participants earning 1 minimum salary or less, while many other plans reported
under one percent of affiliates in this category. Conversely, the fraction of affiliates
earning 16-25 minimum salaries is also variable, ranging from close to 0 to as high
as 30%. Since account balances will clearly grow faster for plans with more highlypaid contributors, individual AFORES have an interest in boosting the fraction of
high earners participating in their plans.

18

Recent data on affiliates and fund totals may be found at
www.consar.gob.mx/pages/estadisticas.
19

More recent data are not available; also the fraction of active affiliates for AFORE
XXI is probably low (communication from the General Manager, AFORE XXI, 9/97).

10

AFORES Expenses and Commissions
Pension managers commonly charge for services rendered while managing
a pension fund. These commissions and expenses can take many different forms,
with some managers electing to levy a one-time frontload on invested assets; others
take a fraction of returns or a percent of assets under management; and still others
have combinations of these expense arrangements.
The Mexican government has permitted each AFORE to design its own
approach to commissions, in contrast to reforms in other countries.20 The typical
pattern that has emerged among AFORES is a one-time up-front fee on
contributions; as Table 3 shows, seven of the 17 AFORES selected to levy only a
front load averaging 1.67% of covered pay. But the table also shows that another
seven plans imposed both a one-time pay-based charge totaling 1.27% of pay and
an additional annual 1.03% of assets. The remaining three plans charged either an
annual percent of assets alone (4.75%), a fraction of annual real returns alone
(33%), or a commission levied on both contribution amounts and returns. It should
be noted that these commissions correspond to first-year rates only; that is, the
AFORES promise to reduce commissions for loyal participants who remain over a
longer period of time. The declining commission pattern is intended to discourage
workers from moving their money into a new AFORE when cross-fund transfers are
permitted.
What do these AFORE commissions cover? In principle, they are intended
to compensate the pension fund system for the entire range of expenses that the

20

In Chile, for example, only one-time front loads are permitted.
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AFORES must pay in the process of carrying out the four key functions of a pension
plan, namely the collection of contributions, money management, recordkeeping,
and benefit payouts. In addition, of course, these commissions should include
normal profit given that the AFORES are private sector firms, and they will a lso
include some fraction of start-up costs as amortized over some longer period. An
important yet delicate issue is to determine which costs might properly be
considered “start-up” costs and thus nonrecurring, versus which should be
considered long-term. For instance, during 1997 the Mexican AFORES engaged a
total of 83,000 agents to solicit potential affiliates as the system was launched, for
an average of 130 affiliates per agent (Table 4). Advertising costs at start-up
totaled over half a billion US dollars or US$85 per affiliate (the range was from $14
to $340). Most of the advertising costs at start-up (72%) were devoted to television
commercials (Table 5), but strategies varied tremendously across plans with some
AFORES doing virtually no advertising via the press.
Signing up new participants should become more routine, and hence less
expensive, over time. But other expenses will be ongoing, such as those pertaining
to money collection and investment procedures. The Mexican social security
agency (IMSS) currently helps the AFORES system by working with employers to
collect contributions in a central and computerized way. For this service the IMSS
charges AFORES a support service fee of US$2.20/account/year (see Appendix).
Employers must then deposit funds with a nongovernmental bank (Entidad
Receptor) that serves as a fund conduit for employers’ payroll tax deposits; these
banks charge the AFORES US$0.37/account/year for handling the money. The

12

Central Bank of Mexico collects the funds at the next step and passes them to
nongovernmental banks; it pays a real interest rate of 2% on accumulated funds.
These nongovernmental banks (Bancos Liquidadores) disburse workers’ funds to
each AFOREs, a service for which they charge US$2.80 per deposit (or $16.80 per
year assuming 6 annual deposits). Data collection is also an ongoing expense;
PROCESAR, the privately managed information-gathering firm, charges
US$2.5/account/year to the AFORES for servicing employee accounts and data
collection (1997).
The system has tried hard to track many of the potential charges under the
current regulatory structure, but it appears that some have not yet been included in
cost estimates (see Appendix). One item not currently included in AFORES charges
is the cost of the supervisory agency CONSAR. This agency’s budget of US$22M
was subsidized by the central government and international lending agencies during
the start-up year. If CONSAR’s budget remained constant and if it were spread
over the approximately 11M participants, additional supervisory costs might total
approximately $2/affiliate/year. These clearly will not rise linearly with participant
size, so scale economies are to be expected in the future. Also few AFORES
participants are near retirement age, so virtually no costs are now devoted to
managing the benefit payout process. As a result, current AFORES administrative
charges do not now include charges for establishing retirees’ eligibility, determining
the value of lump sum or programmed withdrawal payouts (if these are chosen),
and for those deciding to purchase annuities, the cost associated with annuitizing
the pension benefit at retirement. These expenses will rise in the future. Finally,

13

costs of other regulatory/supervisory entities are apparently not presently levied
against the AFORES system, thought the pension funds certainly rely on them to a
large degree (e.g. the insurance commission, the securities and exchange
commission, the rating agency). These may fall as the program grows.
Comparing Commissions Across Pension Funds
Before further assessing AFORES expense, it is useful to acknowledge that
the AFORES commissions are difficult to compare across different funds in Mexico
(Table 3). That is, one must determine how to evaluate a wide range of frontloaded, asset-based, and return-based commissions; furthermore, the fees charged
change the longer a participant leaves his monies in a given account. To make
these fees comparable, CONSAR, the government supervisory agency, has
simulated commissions paid and benefits received under the different AFORES
commission structures (1997a). This exercise requires assuming (1) a wage level
and hence a contribution level, (2) a holding period, and (3) a real rate of return and
wage growth rate. For the results reported here, we focus on a hypothetical
average worker earning three times the minimum wage (average earnings for
AFORES-covered workers). The results also assume zero real pay growth and real
annual investment returns are set at either 3.5% or 5%. Two holding periods
considered are 25 and 40 years, respectively. These computations also assume
that the government’s additional “social quota” is not included in the contribution
amount, and that the participant has a SAR accumulation of $4,000, immediately
transferred into the AFORES plan.21

21

As noted above, the transferal of SAR funds began only in recent months.
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Illustrative comparisons of average commissions charged under the various
AFORES appear in Table 6. Here the average commission is computed as the
present value of annual commissions cumulated over the holding period in each
AFORE. For the hypothetical average worker, the front-loaded AFORES
commission equals 1.9% of pay on a one-time basis; this assumes that the worker
contributes over a 25-year period and earns a 3.5% real interest rate on
contributions. If the worker instead faced a 40-year period and invested at the
same interest rate, the resulting AFORES commission is higher, at 2.5% of pay.
This is the result of nonlinear commission charges that change over time. If the
investment return were instead 5%, average commissions would grow to between
2.26-2.7% of pay. These commissions can alternatively be converted to a fraction
of the worker’s annual contribution, instead of assuming a full frontload. From this
perspective, commissions are equivalent to a 30-40% cut in the worker’s new
contribution to the AFORES account (=.025 or 0.020/.065).22 Conversely, if
commissions are instead amortized over the worklife, average commissions are
equal to a one-third cut in the participant’s annual real investment return. 23
This average also conceals cross-fund variation in costs. Thus the
commission charged by the most expensive pension plan is twice that of the least
expensive AFORE, suggesting that a careful consumer could save much more by
comparison shopping across funds. And because the commissions rise with real
22

For consistency this computation excludes the social quota, as do all the
CONSAR computations.
23

A cost normalization concept more familiar to developed country readers is the
percentage charge on assets, these would equal 1.3 to 1.4% of assets annually (or
130-140 basis points) on average; see Consar 1997a.
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return and the length of time the monies are left in the pension plan, long -term
participants during high-return periods would benefit the most from “shopping
around”. Plan rankings by commissions prove rather stable across simulated
holding periods and interest rates. 24
Ultimately commissions will reduce the amount of assets available to pay
retiree benefits. Assuming that an AFORE could earn a real 3.5% return on assets
over 25 years, the average participant would accumulate a total of US$10,800 (or
US$13,400 at a 5% real return). This accrual would be worth 78% (77%) of the
value of what the retiree could have accumulated if no pension commissions were
charged. In other words, the accumulated commission would amount to about onequarter the terminal value of a fund that charged no commissions. This exercise is
purely academic, of course, since a funded system could not operate at a zero
commission level. Over a 40-year holding period the simulated net accumulation
would be larger – US$21,000 -31,000 – but the reduction due to the commission
now approaches 30% of the final sum. Again, the range of costs shown should be
noted, with the net balance reduced by 16% in the least-cost case, and by 42% in
the highest-cost instance. Correlations across plans are as before, in the 0.9 range,
indicating consistency of plan cost rankings within the range of simulated outcomes
given here.
One reason that analysts find it interesting to examine commissions in this
way is that the Mexican government guarantees a minimum benefit if a worker’s
AFORES account proves to be too small. Further, this minimum guaranteed benefit
24

However actual returns across AFOREs are not all the same, implying that
commissions should be computed for different realized return patterns.
16

is financed in part from general revenue, so higher administration costs could result
in potentially higher costs for the government. It has been estimated that an
average-wage worker in the system for 25 years would have to earn a real return of
6.35% on his pension assets, given the average AFORE commission, for him to
accumulate enough to pay a benefit that exceeds the government guaranteed
pension.25 Actual AFORES investment returns were above this threshold during
the system’s first year of operation but fell below the hurdle rate in 1998.26 Future
returns will depend importantly on lo wering commissions and expanding investment
options. Without this, real net returns may not be high enough permit average and
low-wage workers to amass an individual account paying over the guaranteed
minimum. 27

25

If the pension commission were 2.5%, the hurdle rate required to beat the
government guarantee would be even higher – 6.92% – for the average-wage
employee (required returns are even higher for someone paid only one minimum
salary); see CONSAR (1997b).
26

The real rate of return paid to the to AFORES funds through 1997 was 8.1%
(CONSAR 1998) and during the first 8 months of 1998 it was 2.26%
(www.consar.gob.mx).
27

Periods of unemployment will also reduce the worker’s accumulation amount as
well as his chances of receiving the guaranteed minimum benefit. Partida-Bush
(1997) predicts that the typical male covered by the AFORES system will not work
enough years in covered employment to quality for the minimum pension (and work
histories for women are even less propitious). This concern is recognized by
CONSAR (1998) which acknowledges that workers average 21 years in covered
employment by age 65 at present, fewer than the 24 required under the new law to
obtain the minimum pension. Of course participants will still have access to
benefits payable from their AFORES accounts, even if they are not eligible for the
guaranteed minimum.
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Start-up versus Long Run Considerations
Because the Mexican AFORES system is still young, it is difficult to
determine exactly how much of the first-year costs incurred will diminish through
time. Nevertheless AFORES expenses should fall for several reasons:
hActual commissions as a fraction of assets are lower than those just
described because the CONSAR calculations exclude the “social quota”
contribution deposited by the government for low-wage workers totaling 2.2%
of their pay. Including this additional contribution reduces pension
commissions from 30-40% of the first-year’s contribution to about 23-29%.
hAs SAR and INFONAVIT funds are transferred to AFORES accounts,
scale economies should reduce commissions. This influx of funds is a critical
element in supporting rapid growth in AFORES accounts.
hExpenses charged should fall as costs incurred at start-up diminish, due to
system growth and learning-by-doing. For instance, it is expected that the
pension sales force can shrink and advertising drop once most participants
select an AFORE. Participants will also become better informed about
AFORE performance once CONSAR’s methodology becomes widely used to
report gross and net returns on AFORE investments.
hAFORES costs can fall if the government reduces its charges for tax
collection and bank handling of funds. As employers, banks, the pension
funds, and the government become more adept handling contributions,
record-keeping, and investing of funds, lower fees may be feasible.
hNew technology should lower pension collection costs. Larger employers
will soon be able to deposit payroll tax contributions via electronic fund
transfer with the “Entidades Receptoras”, and this should lower the cost of
handling these accounts. The IMSS collection fee, the “Banco Liquidador”
fee, and the PROCESAR handling fee could likewise become the subject of
renegotiation.
h Some of the larger AFORES may benefit from cost-reductions sooner
than the smaller ones, and may pass these savings on to participants.
However, current rules prohibit any one AFORE from having more than 20%
of the pension market, a practice that limits scale economies. A process to
raise this size cap should be implemented to reward more efficient providers.
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Lest it be thought that current AFORES commissions will inevitably fall
through time, it is worth drawing attention to factors pushing commissions up in the
future. These include the following:
h The system will soon allow more than a single fund (SIEFORE) per
AFORE. This will reduce workers’ incentives to transfer across plans, cutting
transfer costs, but multiple funds in one pension plan will boost service costs
due to multiple investment options.
hAs additional investment options per AFORE are permitted, more time and
money must be devoted to investor education and retirement financial
planning, raising expenses. 28
hUnder current rules, transfers across AFORES are permitted only once per
year; there is some concern that AFORES costs would rise if workers were
permitted to move their funds several times per year.29 On the othe r hand,
commissions might fall if daily transfers were permitted, since sales’ agents
would benefit little by getting workers to switch funds (Shah 1997).
h Expenses will rise as the AFORES investment options are broadened to a
larger set of assets. This can be moderated if low-cost indexed portfolios are
selected.
h Pension system costs may rise if the AFORES are asked to cover the
CONSAR budget, as those costs are not presently paid for within the system.
hExpenses will rise as the system matures and workers reach retirement
age, since plans must gain expertise and provide expanded service in
establishing participant eligibility for benefits (including survivor benefits), the
actual payment of retirement income, and linkage with the IMSS minimum
benefit guarantee .
hAFORES do not currently account for insurance loads associated with
buying a retirement annuity. Some propose adding this cost into the
expenses of managing an individual account pension system.
28

US defined contribution plans report spending almost $6/participant/year on this
effort currently; see Plan Sponsor (1997).
29

In Chile, 50% of workers transfer their money from one plan to another annually
costing a very high $120/transfer fee per worker per year (Valdes 1997b). By
contrast in Argentina turnover is much lower – only 12% of plan participants moved
in 1996 – and the rate is expected to fall due to regulations limiting fund switching
(Superintendencia de AFJP 1997).

19

Administrative Costs in Other Systems
One way to evaluate whether Mexican pension system costs might rise or fall
in the future is to compare these with costs in other pension models. For example,
other countries have adopted individual account pensions, including Chile,
Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia; private sector pension alternatives are also frequently
offered as benchmarks for comparison purposes.
One difficulty with such comparisons is that other pension systems are
generally structured differently from the Mexican program, with different services
and sometimes receive subsidies from the government. Take for example the tax
collection function. In Mexico, as noted above, tax collection for the AFORES is
handled by the central tax authority in exchange for a government-set collection
cost fee. By contrast, the government tax authority in Argentina does not charge a
collection fee to the AFJP pensions; as a result, reported collection expenses are
artificially low (Rofman 1997). In Chile, contributions are collected by individual
agents, a n approach that is apparently more costly than a central collection
authority; also competitive pressures have not been effective in driving down
commissions over time (Valdes 1997a). In the US, corporate and public sector
pension contributions are typically gathered via the employer, a practice that affords
participants of important scale economies not available in the Chilean case.30

30

Pending legislation would permit Chilean employers to collect contributions and
negotiate commissions with the AFPs directly, which may lower collection costs in
that nation (Valdes 1997a). For a comparison of US public and private pension
plans see Mitchell and Carr (1996).
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Money management services and investment behavior also differ across
pension systems, policies that in turn influence pension expense comparisons.
Research shows that an active asset management policy produces higher
administrative charges as compared to an indexed portfolio (Mitchell 1998a).
Money management costs also depend importantly on scale: investment expenses
are less for larger funds than for smaller ones (Mitchell and Andrews 1981).
Consequently, newer and actively managed pension systems such as the AFORES
will experience higher management costs simply by virtue of their smaller size, as
compared to older, more established funds.
Pension plan costs differ according to their record-keeping and payout
functions as well, differences that also must be taken into account when comparing
pension plans of different types and in different countries. For example, in C hile,
the individual account pension system permits a range of options for benefit
payment, ranging from mandated real annuities to lump-sum payouts (Mitchell and
Barreto 1997). Allowing more options will be more expensive than requiring all
benefits to be paid in a single format.31 Also some national pension systems, most
notably in Chile, Peru, and Argentina, must handle workers’ Recognition Bonds
issued under the old national pay-as-you-go plan. This raises costs for the
additional record-keeping, transactions, determination of eligibility, and payout
services that other nations’ systems do not handle. In countries where the oldsystem transition liabilities remain with the government social security system as in

31

Also permitting multiple payout options opens the possibility of adverse selection;
see Mitchell, Poterba, Warshasky, and Brown (forthcoming).
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Mexico, the funded pension accounts will be relieved of these additional tasks and
related charges. 32
Keeping in mind these service and performance differences, it is still of some
interest to ask how the individual-account components of national pension systems
compare across countries. One approach converts all reported expenses into a
single, one-time, front load as a fraction of pay. According to this calculation, the
Mexican AFORES administrative costs at 1.9% of payroll are below those of the
individual account programs in Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay (2.4%, 2.4%,
2.4% and 2.1% respectively; CONSAR 1997a). It is somewhat fortuitous that these
figures are as close to one another as they are, since only the Chilean system has
been around long enough to argue that start-up costs have been amortized, while
the other systems are still experiencing start-up expenses. If the relative ranking is
taken seriously, it appears that the streamlined design of the Mexican pension
system may have contributed to lower expenses, ever during the first year of the
program.
Other pension programs may also be explored for cost comparisons. The US
social security system currently boasts of very low costs – annual administrative
expenses under 1% of contributions – but this is an old, large system (140M
employees) and it has virtually no money management costs by virtue of it being
mainly pay-as-you-go. Funded institutional pensions in the US charge about
$50/participant/year in record-keeping fees and 20-50 basis points per year or less
32

Some plans continue to permit workers to participate in a national pay-as-you-go
program, either on a transitional basis, as in Chile, or on an ongoing basis.
Maintaining paralle l systems will almost certainly produce higher overall retirement
system costs for the multiple-tier system as a whole.
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in money management fees (0.2%-0.5% of assets; Mitchell 1998a). The Mexican
pension system’s charges of approximately 120 to 150 basis points annually exceed
the US funded plan charge, but are well below Chilean mutual fund costs of over
500 basis points (Valdes 1997b) and Mexican mutual fund costs of 200-250 basis
points per year (CONSAR 1997a). Hence, at present, the costs of operating the
Mexican AFORES system are not as low as those of the very large US institutional
pension plans, but they are well under those charged by several other pension and
similar institutions in Latin America.
Identifying Cost-Cutting Opportunities without Prejudicing Pension
Performance
It should be recalled that cost-cutting should not be the goal of pension
system design. Rather, it is a means to an end – namely boosting pension payouts
to participants (given contribution levels). 33 But judging the eventual payout of a
pension system can take decades, which is one reason it is difficult to assess how a
particular cost-cutting measure will influence pension outcomes. For this reason,
pension practitioners often adopt a variety of interim performance standards, criteria
that are useful for monitoring plan performance over the shorter run. Having such
performance standards clearly spelled out reduces the chance that an agency
charged with pension oversight focuses overly on cost-reduction while overlooking
service delivery issues. We discuss several useful benchmarks in turn.
33

Some governments see pensions as meeting a wide range of goals including
financing budget deficits and/or funding social investments. However if a pension
system is to keep participants’ interests topmost, social activism in the pension fund
must be discouraged (Fields and Mitchell 1993). Indeed, invesmtent returns fall
when pension investments are limited to assets “targeted” for social purposes
(Mitchell and Hsin 1997).
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Investment Benchmarks
Pension fiduciaries are charged with setting and then ensuring that money
managers meet investment performance standards. In the US, defined contribution
participants generally can select which assets to include in their own portfolios; for
them, conventional wisdom suggests that the appropriate performance benchmark
is a market index that compares most closely to the “style” of fund selected. A
benchmark for a stock fund might be the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index (S&P
500), or for a bond fund the Shearson Lehman Hutton Government-Corporate Bond
Index, or for a government securities fund, the return on short-term Treasury bills.34
Generally investors are advised to compare net returns – after administrative
expenses – with the relevant index to determine whether investment performance is
up to par.
While these are sensible benchmarks in the US, it is less clear what
investment performance standards should be held up for government-sponsored
national defined contribution pension plans in other countries. When governments
restrict investments to domestic assets, as in the case of Mexico, global net return
benchmarks will almost certainly not be met and there is little a participant can do to
diversify holdings and hence alter risk-adjusted returns. In the future, as additional
asset pools are added to the AFORES accounts, participants will naturally seek
advice on which performance benchmarks their fund investments should equal or

34

A more sophisticated approach would take into account a pension plan’s actual
portfolio mix and compare the actual to risk-adjusted benchmark returns when
assessing the efficacy of investment strategies. Pension investment strategies are
discussed in Berkowitz et al. (1988); Good and Love (1990); Logue (1991); and
Logue and Rader (1997).
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beat. One investment performance criterion that could be adopted for this purpose
might be the risk-adjusted real return on a nationally diversified portfolio of
marketable stocks and bonds. Another reasonable criterion when investments are
permitted outside of Mexico would be a risk-adjusted return on an internationally
diversified global portfolio.
Regardless of the standard chosen, AFORES participants will benefit from
the government continuing to play an active role in standardizing the reporting of net
returns on investments. This helps the less financially literate participants assess
the long-run impact of AFORES commission structures on retirement
accumulations. Others have suggested that all funds be forced to use the same
commission structure such as a yearly asset-based fee (Valdes 1997a). 35
Pension Plan Service Benchmarks: Tax Collection, Recordkeeping, Benefit Payouts
Since pension systems produce a number of services in addition to money
management, participants would benefit from having a set of indicators to judge
how well each pension plan is performing on non-financial criteria. For example, the
CONSAR system currently tracks how quickly and accurately taxes are collected
and invested. Down the road it should also evaluate customer satisfaction,
including how quickly and satisfactorily an AFORE responds to participant queries,
how long it takes claimants to determine eligibility for benefits and start receiving
checks, and how the system detects and corrects fraud. Related issues include
how well the system can acquire SAR and INFONAVIT funds, and whether people
35

Requiring all funds to charge an annual percent of assets still allows AFORES to
compete on price, but it does not levy disproportionately high charges on workers
with low pension accumulations. It also increases an AFORE manager’s incentive
to grow the participants’ assets more than does a front-load commission.
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add their own voluntary contributions o n top of the mandated sums. 36 PROCESAR
and CONSAR have implemented an impressive data gathering effort that answers
some of these questions; additional consumer satisfaction surveys are likely worth
doing. In addition reporting and disclosure efforts, as well as participant education,
will demand additional commitments of time and money over the next several years.
Pension System Design Issues
In addition to investment and service benchmarks, there are several system
design issues that must receive special attention going forward, to ensure that
administrative costs are reduced as much as possible. As has already been seen,
the smaller AFORES are probably not financially viable and may need to be
absorbed by larger plans. This process of consolidation must managed so as to
minimize workers’ concern that the entire system might come under threat. Rules
permitting workers to switch pension funds may also impact costs.
Specific Proposals for Mexico’s AFORES System
While pension expenses in Mexico may fall o ver time of their own accord as
the system gains in participants, assets, and expertise, it is worth asking how the
AFORES framework could be further adapted to lower administrative costs in the
future – without prejudicing performance. We organize our discussion around each
of the pension functions in turn.

36

In addition, it would be enormously useful to track the integration between the
retirement system and the Mexican Disability and Survivor insurance system.
Again, CONSAR could play a key role in developing service benchmarks and
publicizing these on an annual basis.
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Tax Collection
The basic tax collection activity for pension funds in Mexico requires that a
covered sector employer determines what each employee owes, and then the firm
must deduct this amount from each employee’s gross salary. At month’s end, and
within a determinate number of working days, the employer must deposit the
amount owed at special authorized banks approved by the social security system.
Individual AFORES and their agents do not have a n active role to play in the weekin and week-out grass-roots tax collection effort in Mexico (unlike in Chile).
Given this already fairly streamlined structure, how could tax collection be
made more efficient? Several suggestions for reform are offered, though we note
that some might potentially raise, rather than curtail, costs.
n The IMSS currently subsidizes the computation of payroll tax obligations by
helping firms do their calculations in the IMSS regional offices free of charge.
This subsidy is probably greater for small firms that are not computerized, and is
likely more modest for large technologically sophisticated firms. Charging fees
for this assistance would make the system better reflect the “resource costs” of
the IMSS help, though it would also likely reduce utilization and possibly
participation among low-wage employers.
n The IMSS has outsourced the pension payroll tax collection function by
awarding several nongovernmental banks four - year contracts (solicited through
a competitive process and to be rebid at the end of the period). These
“Entidades Receptoras” charge AFORES an annual fee of P$2.93/act
(US$0.37), admittedly a low per-capita figure, but one that could conceivably be
further reduced in the future. Other fee structures should be examined,
including making the annual fee a (declining) function of the return on assets.
n Payroll tax collection costs are not competitively set, and this fee should be
renegotiated downward over time. Also the private banks managing this
function may be willing to reduce their fee if they are successful in cross-selling
products (e.g. voluntary saving accounts).
n Additional computerization of the payroll tax collection process could drive down
Mexican collection costs in the future. Larger firms are already discussing with
the government the possibility of using electronic fund transfer for employer
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deposits; further efforts along these lines would be beneficial. Conversely, it
might be feasible to allow price discrimination by employer size, so that the
larger employers would pay less due to their economies of scale. It would also
be useful to allow employers of any size, and particularly smaller firms, to
affiliate with a clearing-house or affinity group so as to be charged lower tax
collection fees. If this latter step were taken, it would be essential to implement
prudential regulation so that these entities would have to properly account for
the funds.
n Because tax collection and flow of funds management is not costless,
performance standards should be continually reassessed and a cost-benefit
tradeoff function devised. Participants in a defined contribution pension system
tend to expect that the transfer of their funds from payroll to investment markets
will happen with some alacrity and accuracy. But in Mexico now, a full month or
more may pass before the employee’s funds are actually invested by the
AFORES. Mechanisms should be instituted to reward the faster investment of
funds.
n The Mexican pension system seems to be working relatively well at present,
though in Chile there are charges of tax evasion, questions about the
effectiveness of pension plan advertising, rumors about agents “pressuring”
participants to join their plan, and other questionable practices. Collection
problems sho uld be monitored, publicized, and be brought to a neutral grievance
authority for resolution in short order.

Money Management
Turning now to the money management function, there are several steps that
the Mexican government could do to encourage better information and perhaps
induce cuts in pension administration expenses:
n Mexican pension participants would benefit from a periodic review of fees
charged by the various players to the AFORES system, including the collecting
banks, IMSS, and other parties. Further, it would be useful to schedule a
periodic re-negotiation of these fees, since otherwise start-up costs may become
embedded in the system more permanently.
n The AFORES offer only a limited investment portfolio at present, and for the
most part there are few important cross-pension differences in services. Thus
money management fees are the main area where competition can occur in the
short run, and this is facilitated by standardized reporting and dissemination of
expense information.
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n Mexican money management costs should fall with time as a result of the rapid
growth of the pension fund assets. Scale economies will be better served by
rapid integration of outstanding SAR and INFONAVIT funds, and by removing
the size cap on the largest pension funds.
n As pension portfolios are liberalized, SIEFORES must be asked to compare their
investment performance with reasonable benchmarks. The government should
examine and recommend a range of such benchmarks to facilitate discussion for
the relatively uneducated.

Recordkeeping
One impressive aspect of the AFORES system is its attention to
recordkeeping. This was facilitated by the decision to adopt a computerized payroll
taxes reporting system, daily computerized portfolio composition reporting by the
pension funds, and numerous other technologically advanced oversight methods.
Some additional steps would include the following:
n The supervisory agency, CONSAR, should require that AFORES publish annual
standardized reports providing pension gross and net flows, investment patterns,
retirement and other payouts, and expenses.
n Participants could be charged according to the services they use, a practice that
would raise charges for some but would greatly reduce cross-subsidization
(Valdes 1997b). For example, an AFORES could charge all participants a (low)
one-time annual report fee and an additional charge for those wanting
personalized reports on pension assets and retirement benefit calculations. In
addition the funds could charge separate fees to those seeking financial
planning, help on divorce or invalidity and survivor benefits, and transfers.
Benefit Eligibility & Payouts
Because of the newness of the Mexican AFORES system, few participants
are in the payout phase. When the system matures, however, there will be costs for
determining participant eligibility and benefit amounts, computing minimum benefit
guarantees, and handling funds for the disabled and survivor plan beneficiaries.
Efforts to reduce costs here could include some of the following:
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n It would be useful to centralized and streamline the issuance of birth certificates
and social security identification numbers on a national basis. This would help
tax collection and record-keeping when young people enter the labor market.
Similarly, a study should be done on the way workers’ contribution and eligibility
determination records are kept, as well as retirement and death events, to see
what could be done to make this component of recordkeeping more efficient.
n To reduce cross-subsidization of different payout activities, the AFORES could
be permitted to charge a separate fee to cover lump sum or programmed
withdrawal benefits. For example, the AFORES are responsible for computing a
disabled worker’s lump sum amount that is then used to buy a life annuity from a
private insurer. Similarly, survivors of insured workers may receive a lump sum
from the AFORES. Currently these services are provided free of charge, and it
would be useful to estimate these cross-subsidies. More generally, it would be
useful to have a study on the different benefit delivery options, justified by an
analysis of service inputs and other input costs.
n It would be useful to prepare a study of the annuity market in Mexico to ascertain
what likely annuity loads will be charged by private insurers. These charges
should be compared with those levied by insurers in other countries to see how
comparable they are, and what changes in the insurance market may be needed
to reduce these eventual charges.
n The government should conduct a study of the disability and survivors insurance
market in Mexico, to ascertain what pricing techniques are used to determine
premiums and how these compare with those of disability and survivor insurance
in other countries. It is possible that some changes in the insurance market may
be useful in reducing these charges. Since the disabled and surviving
dependents are currently receiving AFORES payouts, attention to this set of
questions will be important in the short run. 37

On some of these points, there is concern that reforming expenses under the
AFORES system might make it more expensive for the poor. Currently the average
worker’s annual AFORES contribution (gross of fees) is estimated at about
US$360/year (8.7% of $350/mo including the social quota). In even the rosiest
scenario – one consistent with rates at the lowest-cost institutional US mutual funds
– a low-cost AFORE might charge an administrative fee of $50 with investment
37

An initial investigation into the Mexican disability insurance system appears in
Mitchell (1998b).
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costs close to zero. In this event, the average Mexican worker would be left with
only around $300 to invest in his pension each year; a minimum-wage earner would
fare correspondingly worse. Such low investments will not guarantee a comfortable
retirement, even with reasonable real returns and a relatively long work period prior
to retirement. One potential answer would be to subsidize commissions for the
poor, a policy that would achieve greater equity under the system without unduly
interfering with pricing information provided by market-based AFORES
commissions. Indeed the government’s current “social quota” contribution already
performs this function in part, inasmuch as it is targeted primarily at employees with
low wages.
Conclusion
Many have hailed the Mexican AFORES system as a tremendous success
during its first year of implementation. Enrollment has soared, many AFORES are
now competing for market share, the supervisory system involving PROCESAR and
CONSAR appears to be functioning well, and substantial funds have flowed into the
Mexican capital market. And even during this initial start-up phase, the good news
is that expenses appear to be lower than older, more established, individual account
pension systems in sister Latin American nations.
Nevertheless questions remain about the future path of administrative
expenses, and indeed about how the system itself will evolve through time. We
have shown that expenses may fall for several compelling reasons, but there are
also reasons that costs could rise unless a concerted effort is devoted to keeping
them down. One way costs can be lowered and benefits boosted is to increase the
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size of the AFORES system, an outcome that depends on rapidly transferring SAR
and INFONAVIT assets to the new program. In addition, expanding investment
options will permit higher risk-adjusted returns, requiring international diversification
of pension investments. Ultimately, more generous retirement benefits depend on
the size of the investment, and the net investment earnings on these accounts, both
of which depend on a more efficient pension administrative system.
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Table 1.
1997 AFORES Affiliates, % Active Affiliates, and Pay Levels of
Actives

AFORE

Total
Average
Atlantico
Banamex
Bancomer
Bancrecer
Banorte
Bital
Capitaliza
Confia
Garante
Genesis
Inbursa
Previnter
Profuturo GNP
Santander
Tepeyac
XXI
Zurich

[a]
Total
Affiliates

[b]
%Active
Affil's

[b]*
Percent
Low wage

[b]**
Percent
High Wage

10,732,375
631,316

81

6.0%

5.9%

158,146
1,354,504
1,870,677
486,513
652,428
970,326
16,048
63,128
1,151,129
109,134
284,717
246,937
1,367,780
1,610,919
92,516
277,901
19,572

91
91
90
86
89
90
89
91
79
84
96
91
62
74
62
21
94

1.3%
14.3%
20.0%
4.3%
5.7%
11.7%
0.0%
0.4%
8.2%
0.8%
1.3%
4.3%
13.8%
15.1%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%

1.0%
18.6%
30.1%
2.1%
2.9%
5.5%
0.1%
0.5%
6.7%
0.4%
19.1%
3.4%
3.5%
4.9%
0.3%
0.5%
0.1%

Source:
[a] CONSAR statistics as of Nov. 1997
[b] CONSAR statistics as of July 8, 1997
Notes: Average daily pay ~ 3.2 minimum salaries (1 minimum = P24.65 or ~$3.10 US).
*AFORE share of affiliated lowest-wage group; lowest group earns 0 to 1 minimum
salary.
**AFORE share of affiliated highest wage group; highest group earns 16-25 minimum
salaries
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Table 2.
1998 AFORES Affiliates by Market
Share

AFORE

Total
Average
Atlantico Promex
Banamex
Bancomer
Bancrecer Dresdener
Solida Banorte Generali
Bital
Capitaliza
Confia/Principal
Garante
Genesis Metropolitan
Inbursa
Previnter
Profuturo GNP
Santander Mexicano
Tepeyac
XXI
Zurich

Total
Affiliates

Market Share

13,305,606
782,683

5.9%

188,202
1,504,226
2,146,395
596,590
1,143,907
1,237,761
52,895
99,220
1,497,705
141,236
311,598
305,582
1,586,393
1,925,409
113,608
400,346
54,533

1.4%
11.3%
16.1%
4.5%
8.6%
9.3%
0.4%
0.7%
11.3%
1.1%
2.3%
2.3%
11.9%
14.5%
0.9%
3.0%
0.4%

Source:
www.notisar.com/afore/consar9891_htm
Sept. 1998
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Table 3.
AFORES Commissions on Active Pension
Accounts
Front-load
% of Pay

Annual
Note % of Assets Note

Annual
% on Real
ROR

Average

1.29

0.71

3.12

Atlantico
Banamex
Bancomer
Bancrecer
Banorte
Bital
Capitaliza
Confia
Garante
Genesis
Inbursa
Previnter
Profuturo
GNP
Santander
Tepeyac
XXI
Zurich

1.40
1.70
1.70
0.00
1.00
1.68
1.60
0.90
1.68
1.65
0.00
1.55
1.70

0.00
0.00
0.00
4.75
1.50
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50

20.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
33.00
0.00
0.00

AFORE

1.70
1.17
1.50
0.95

*, ***
***

***
***

**
**

1.00
1.00
0.99
1.25

**

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Source: CONSAR July 1997; 1998 commissions virtually identical
(www.notisar.com)
Notes:
* Initial rate is 0.2% of pay rising to 1.7% by March of 1998.
** Charge on assets to fall over time if participant remains in that
AFORE.
*** Charge to fall over time if participant remains in that AFORE.
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Table 4.
AFORES Expenses and Agents at
Start-Up
[a]
[b]
# Agents #Affiliates

Total
Average

82,523 10,732,375
4,854

Affil
/Agent

[c]

(Pesos) [c]

(US$) [d]

Startup
Costs (000P)

Startup
Costs/Affil

Startup
Costs/Affiliate

$680

$85

$4,230,895
130

Source: [a] CONSAR statistics 11/97
[b] PROCESAR (1997)
[c] AMAFORES statistics 8/1997 (000 pesos)
[d] (Previous column)/8 pesos per $1US

Table 5.
AFORES Advertising Expenses by Type at
Start-Up

Average
Minimum
Maximum

TV Ads

Radio Ads

Press
Ads

72
0
94

16
0
78

12
0
75

% of Budget to:
Magazine
Total Adv. Budget

0
0
0

Source: CONSAR statistics 1997
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US$14.6M

Table 6.
AFORES Commissions Expressed as 1-Time Front-loaded Amount
(charge as % of Pay; by return and holding period)
[a]

[b]

[c]

25-year Holding
Period
r=3.5
r=5

[d]

40-year Holding
Period
r=3.5
r=5

Average

2.06

2.16

2.47

2.65

Minimum
Maximum
St. Dev.
Correlation
by Holding Period

1.45
2.78
0.45
0.94

1.52
2.85
0.46

1.42
3.53
0.69
0.95

1.45
3.81
0.77

Source: CONSAR (Oct. 1997), [a] p.7; [b] p.8, [c] p.9, [d] p.10
Note: Computations assume worker earns 3 minimum salaries, initial SAR
worth $4,000, real pay increase =0; r is real interest rate.
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Appendix: Mexico’s AFORES Structure, Management, Responsibilities, and
Charges
I. Reported charges for Mexico’s AFORES system
(see below for glossary)
-- Employee makes pension fund selection
-- IMSS set employer payroll tax obligation
-- “Entidades Receptoras”, charge to AFORES
-- Central Bank of Mexico, charge to AFORES
-- IMSS fund collection, handling fee
-- “Banco Licuador”, handling fee
-- AFORES Commissions, charged to participants
insurance
-- INFONAVIT charges to participants
-- CONSAR monitoring costs
-- PROCESAR handling fee
-- Insurance Company annuity fee to retirees
-- Other supervisory agencies:
-- Other groups – SAR charges to participants
(not now part of AFORES system)

NC
NC
P$2.93/act/yr (US$0.37)
NC (float?)
P$16.9/act/year (US$2.20)
P$20/deposit (US$2.80;
16.80/year)
2% of pay, excludes
NA
NC
P$20/acct/yr (US$2.5)
NA
NA
0.8% of assets

[NA = not available; NC = no direct charge levied]
II. Stakeholders under Mexican AFORE system
A. Employee selects pension fund (AFORE):
n Worker selects initial AFORE by signing up with pension agent.
n Once per year, worker may switch to another AFORE (details on ease of and
cost of transfers currently under discussion; all funds must be switched to a new
fund, at once).
n Worker may determine whether any additional “voluntary” savings to go to that
AFORE (funds in addition to mandatory amount).
B. Employer Payroll Tax Obligation:
n Each month, employer determines mandatory contributions to SAR,
INFONAVIT, and IMSS payroll tax due government using supplied software
program (SUA) and each worker’s (unique) ID number (help offered by IMSS
agents in each local IMSS office as needed, free of charge). Voluntary
contributions are also tracked and may be deposited by employer this way.
n Payments for IMSS taxes are deposited monthly at one of 12 “authorized banks”
with outlets in IMSS offices; bimonthly for SAR and INFONAVIT taxes to same
authorities. (Monthly payments due by 17th day of following month; bimonthly
payments due in Jan., Mar., May, July, Sept., and Nov.) Total retirement
contribution is 6.5% (total allocated as 5.15% employer, 1.125% employee, and
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government adds 0.225% of covered pay plus 5.5% of the Mexico City minimum
wage (CONSAR 1997a). INFONAVIT contribution is 5% of covered pay.
n Electronic data transfer on flow of funds to PROCESAR via diskette.
n IMSS does not charge employer for payroll tax computations; employer does not
charge employee for administration. This represents a subsidy to the system
that will likely fall over time as all become more adept; however subsidy is
currently probably larger for small firms since these most likely to have problems
at start-up. On the other hand the employer gets the float on the employee
AFORES contributions for about a month – the time between when the worker
earns the money (on average mid month) and the time the employer must send
off the funds (middle of next month); and for up to two months for INFONAVIT
funds. Value of this float likely to rise with firm-size and pay level.
C. “Entidades Receptoras” (ER’s) – Authorized Receiving Banks:
n IMSS selected with competitive process for 4-year period; new competition
envisioned in 2001.
n Collect employer/employee funds monthly from employers; within 2 days must
pass funds to the Central Bank of Mexico; presumably banks make money from
the float,
n Report to PROCESAR on flow of funds.
n “ER’s” charge P$19.80 plus IVA/employer every 2 months (for a total of P$22.57
~US$2.80) for fund transfer from employers to receivers (IMSS pays 2/3 of cost,
INFONAVIT and AFORES each pay 16%0 or P$17.59 per worker per year
(~US$2.25). Amount charged to AFORES is P$2.93 (US$0.37) per account per
year (CONSAR 1997a). These costs should fall with larger scale, in the future;
however charges are not anticipated to fall under current contract.
D. Central Bank of Mexico:
n Collects employer funds monthly from authorized retail banks and IMSS.
n Forwards required amounts to IMSS for disability and survivors’ insurance,
INFONAVIT for housing fund, and SAR.
n Forwards employees’ and government’s contribution to the AFORE selected by
each worker.
n Bank pays 2% real return to funds.
E. IMSS:
n Helps companies determine employer payroll tax obligations for IMSS,
AFORES, INFONAVIT systems.
n Must pay government share of monthly pension obligation to AFORES (“cuota
social”).
n Receives disability and survivor system contributions, contracts with national
health insurance system to determine eligibility for these programs, and tops up
AFORES accumulation at eligibility for those who require it (i.e. for those whose
AFORES benefit < SI or DI benefit). Turns over funds to private insurer who will
handle future SI/DI benefits.
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n Pays retirees old -system defined benefit pension; offers transition workers
defined benefit pension if this exceeds AFORES amount; in future will also pay
minimum pension guarantee to those with AFORES accruals too small to cover
minimum pension guarantee.
n Handles grievances under pension and DI/SI system; currently access free.
n Pays retiree medical benefits to covered workers (those who paid into system
15+ years).
n Charges:
- IMSS charges AFORES an amount of P$16.9/account/year (~US$2.20) for fund
collection, data checking, and handling fee (PROCESAR 1997).
- Estimated as under 10% of collection costs (IMSS picks up 84%, and 7% is
charged to INFONAVIT (CONSAR 1997a).
- These charges are not scheduled to change in near term, though again one
would anticipate scale economies and learning should cut costs.
F. “Banco Liquidador” – Dispersing Bank:
n On approval from PROCESAR, funds are transferred from the Central Bank to
this dispersal bank that in turn transfers the funds to each of the AFORES. The
bank gets a float on the funds, likely to rise over time.
n Dispersing bank charges PROCESAR P$20/deposit (~US$2.80/deposit or
$16.80/year assuming 6 deposits/yr; PROCESAR 1997). This is likely to fall with
pension plan size in future. PROCESAR in turn charges AFORES (see below).
G. AFORE
n Attracts system participants to that AFORE by hiring/training agents, checking
with PROCESAR regarding employee enrollment records prior to enrollment in
AFORE.
n An AFORE receives funds from several sources:
- Every month receives employee funds (“aportaciones”) and government
contribution (“cuota social”) from Central Bank; invests these within 9 days as
per government regulation.
- Within 4 years should receive SAR funds from old system.
- At worker retirement, should receive INFONAVIT accruals to add to retirement
account.
n Reports:
- daily to CONSAR regarding cash flows and investments.
- periodically to PROCESAR regarding employee turnover.
- at least once a year to participants regarding the account balance.
n Services:
- To date, mostly information and investment.
- Monthly: provides premium payments to survivor, disability insurers.
- Other services soon to become important: participants may request: a 1-time
payout for marriage (equal to 1 month minimum wage); an unemployment
payout every 5 years equal to the lesser of 10% of one’s old-age account
balance, or 75 days of one’s 5-year average pay; CONSAR 1997a); an old-age
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benefit available at age 65; or a severance benefit payable at age 60 (these last
2 require contributions of about 25 years).
- For survivors and disabled, determine value of AFORES sum to be turned over
to disability and survivor i nsurer.
- At retirement the retiree may get a lump sum if the remaining amount will pay a
pension at least 30% greater than the guarantee. Voluntarily paid-in funds can
be taken as lump sum each 6 months. Pension payments may be programmed
withdrawal.
n Reserves must be maintained as per the law.
n Commissions:
- Vary by AFORE; 7 of 17 have a one -time front load on contributions, but others
use combinations of front load, annual fraction of assets, and annual percent of
real return.
- Commissions may decline with time in the fund, but by law the same
commission must apply to all new contributions. At present, exit fees
disallowed. Estimated front-load commission across all AFORES about 2% of
pay (Mitchell 1998a); figure includes money management and record-keeping,
but thus far excludes insurance load for annuity at retirement (as well as
disability and survivor insurance).
H.
n
n
n

INFONAVIT
Bi-monthly: receives funds worth 5% of pay from Central Bank
Invests these funds in housing/real estate.
Provides loans to low-income workers for housing purchase; if not used at
retirement, workers’ funds may be used to buy a bigger retirement annuity.
n Charges: Not clear.
I. CONSAR
n Oversees flow of funds, costs, investments, etc. for entire pension system. Daily
investigation of irregularities using automated system of “200 alarms” permitting
identification of problems immediately (CONSAR 1997b)
n As Supervisory agency, required to implement and monitor regulations & the law
(including portfolio limits, maximum size caps on AFORES share of market,
training & testing of agents, etc).
n Currently operating as grievance and conciliation branch in case of complaints;
access free and costs not reported.
n CONSAR supervises AFORES advertisements and claims for veracity.
n Currently budget of ~US$22M not charged to pension system (subsidized by
central govt). but will be charged in future (P$179M; CONSAR 1997b). If current
levels continue, would be ~US$2.2 per affiliate per year.
J. PROCESAR
n Information-gathering objective:
- Collects data on individual worker contributions, years of service, financial flows
to and from employers, banks, AFORES, and insurers.
- Corrects errors with employers; reconciles employer and employee records.
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Computes IMSS obligation for “cuota social” and computes government amount
for minimum pension.
n Requests fund transfers to AFORES from Central Bank to Liquidator Bank.
n Charges to AFORES (PROCESAR 1997):
Account management
P$10.8/account/year
Receipt, reconciliation
P$1.89/account/event
Certification of employee
P$0.72/event if accepted, 0.09 if declined
Transfer between AFORES
P$0.99/transfer
Transfer Bank/AFORE
P$0.54/transfer
Retirement
P$0.26/account
Change of information
P$0.26/event
Administration of Banks
0.3% on assets
-

K. Insurance Companies:
n Must price life annuities for survivors and disabled on demand.
n If selected by insured, provide life annuity to survivor/disability based on
requisite formula, in exchange for worker’s AFORES accumulation and a “topup” by IMSS.
n Invest funds to generate life annuity.
n Charges: Not yet available. Should be comparable initially to private sector plans
L. Other supervisory agencies:
- Comision Nacional Bancaria y Valores: oversees investment side
- Comision Nacional de Seguros ys Finanzas: in charge of insurance investment
Neither levy costs on AFORES at present.
M. Other Stakeholders:
SAR: Funds accumulated in individual accounts under old SAR system
- Charges now set at 0.8% of assets (CONSAR 1997b)
- Over next 4 years, SAR funds must be transferred to AFORES accounts (no
commission to be charged by agents for this transfer); cross-subsidy from those
without to those with SAR accounts.
Terminology/Glossary:
AFORES: Administradoras de Fondos Para el Retiro
CONSAR: Comision Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro.
IMSS: Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social
INFONAVIT: Instituto Nacional de Fomento y Asistencia para la Vivienda
PROCESAR: Proceso de Recaudacion, Individualizacion, y Dispersion
SIEFORES: Sociedades de Inversion Especializadas de Fondos para el Retiro
SUA: Sistema Unico de Autodeterminacion
Notes: The structure described here applies only to “formal sector” wage and salary
employers and employees in Mexico, inasmuch as informal sector and selfemployed workers are not required to participate in the new system. Exchange rate
P$8=US$1.
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